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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - -
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT 
Intervening Plaintiff 
and appellant 
vs. 
A. P. NEILSON 
vs. 
Defendant in 
Intervention and 
Plaintiff and Re spon-
dant 
HERTA K. DENNETT 
Defendant 
~ ..... 
APPELLANT 15 BRIEF 
., .. 
j 
•,, 
Case No. 
11032 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
. ... ,_ 
This case is an attempt on the part of the 
plaintiff, A. P. Neilson, to foreclose a claimed 
lien on property, or to terminate a claimed "lic-
ense" agreement on the property on which he claims 
a lien. The appeal involves the illegal appoint-
ment of a receiver of the property and an illegal 
turn-over order of monies over which neither the 
purported receiver nor the court had an~r juris-
diction. 
~--."": 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On or about September 13, 1967, the lower 
court, without hearing any evidence of any kind, 
either on the question of the standing of the app1icant 
to seek a receiver, or on the question of cause 
or necessity, entered an order, which purported 
to appoint one Alvin I. Smith as receiver of the 
property involved in this dispute. 
Although the purported receiver has never 
undertaken, even yet, to qualify himself as a receiver 
in accordance with his purported· appointment, the 
lower court, as part of the same order, ordered the 
appellant summarily, and without evidence, a trial, 
or due process, to turn over $1, 800. 00 which ap-
pellant had collected at least two weeks before Mr. 
Smith's purpor~ed appointment. Despite Mr. Smith 1s 
continuing failure to perfect his prima-facia appoint-
ment, or to qualify himself as a receiver of any kind, 
the lower court has persisted in demanding of appel-
lant, that he turn over the $1, 800. 00, and to coerce 
compliance with its illegal order, has ordered the 
appellant to pay a $200. 00 fine, or alternatively to 
spend five days in jail, or alternatively to comply with 
the turn-over order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks relief from the illegal turn-
over order and contempt finding of Judge Wilkins. 
Implicit in that relief is relief from the illegal or-
der of Judge Wilkins appointing Mr. Smith or for 
that matter, anyone, as receiver of the subject 
property. Implidt in that relief is also relief from 
the continuing trespasses and harassments of Mr. 
Smith, who above and beyond the illegality of his appoint-
ment, has yet failed to qualify himself to serve or 
act in any capacity with respect to the property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The business relationship b~tween appel-
lant and A. P. Neilson was the aftermath of a 
business relationship and law suit between A. 
P. Neilson and E. R. VomBaur. Appellant was 
co-owner with Mr. VomBaur of certain business 
and commercial property at 4985 So. State Street 
in Murray City, Utah, commonly known as TEENE 
TOWNE, the property in which this dispute has its 
actual origins. 
Prior to 1960, the TEENE TOWNE property 
was an old run-down, abandoned, dance hall. Mr. 
VomBaur, who had done various assignments and 
sales promotior:s for Mr. Neilson, undertook to 
purchase that property from him. The sale was 
transacted on a Uniform Sales Contract. The 
relationship between Mr. VomBaur was a close 
relationship, being to a large degree social, be-
sides being business, but even moreso, Mr. Neil-
son expressed a fondness for Mr. VomBaur, which 
Mr. Neilson often characterized as a feeling he 
would have towards his own son. 
Mr. VomBaur and Mr. Neilson complemented 
each other to an unusual degree. Mr. Neilson had 
extensive financial resources, including properties 
he wished to promote and sell. Mr. VomBaur had 
unusual talents as a salesman and promoter. 
After owning the TEENE TOWNE property 
for about a year, Mr. VomBaur undertook very 
extensive improvements to modernize the property 
and greatly enhance its value. Within a period of 
about six months, he had increased the appraised 
value from about $125, 000. 00 to about $375, 000. 00. 
Mr. Neilson was pleased with what Mr. 
VomBaur was doing. He made frequent trips to 
the property, conversed with the workmen, ex-
pressed his satisfaction with what they were doing, 
and encouraged them to stay on the job. 
Part way through the improvements, Mr. 
Neilson approached Mr. VomBaur with a plan. 
The plan was simply to get all of the projected 
improvements finished at once, instead of try-
ing to finance them on a shoe-string. Guy Alc!er, 
who made the $3 75, 000. 00 appraisal was an of-
ficer of Zion's First National Bank, and made the 
appraisal for loan purposes. Mr .. Neilson, who 
maintains an excellent credit rating, a very sub-
stantial financial statement, and has good bank-
ing connections, had apparently made approaches 
to Zion's First l\Jational Bankq_nd had received 
tenative approval for a loan as soon as all of the 
improvements were finished. Mr. Neilson saw 
in this the means of getting cash out of the TEENE 
TOWNE_property instead of long-term monthly 
installments. The cash from the Zion's loan would 
pay off his contract all at once. Mr. VomBaur 
was agreeable to the plan of ram-rodding the im-
provements through to early completion. Mr. 
Neilson agreed in writing that he would get a 
bank loan for Mr. VomBaur to pay off the con-
tract and the improvements as soon as the work 
was done.. To expedite the completion of the 
improvements, he told Mr. VomBaur to forget 
the contract installments and to get the work 
done. Mr. VomBaur could work faster if he 
used the monthly installments on the contract as 
Working capital. 
The workmen, encouraged by Mr. Neilson's 
Written promise and his frequent visits upon the 
premises, and by his obvious pleasure at their 
progress, we re willing to work on credit for a 
while. 
Suddenly, Mr. Neilson did an about-face. 
When workmen talked to him, he told them that 
he wasn't going to pay them, but that they would 
have to get their money from Mr. VornBaur. They 
were obviously alarmed, and upon failure of the 
workmen's attorney to get any real assurance from 
Mr. Neilson that he would continue to stand behind 
the project, filed mechanics 1 and materialmen's 
liens and commenced actions to forclose them. 
Upon receiving the summonses, Mr. Neilson 
consulted his attorney, Scott Woodland. Mr. Neil-
son was apparently upset over the action, and while 
maintaining the usual social relationship with Mr. 
VomBaur, decided that he would have to go through 
the .motions of "forfeiting the contract interest of 
Mr. VomBaur, just to make his position clear with 
the workmen. " He said that as soon as the liens 
were cleared, he would re-sell the property to Mr. 
VomBaur on a new contract. Mr. VomBaur took 
this at face value, and closed the operation down 
for a few days. By this time, TEENE TOWNE, 
a teari-ager 1s club was a flourishing business with 
thousands of members and patrons and with nightly 
activities. 
Everything seemed to be going on schedule, 
until one day, it was discovered, that Mr. Neilson 
had, without aid of legal process, broke and entered 
the TEENE TOWNE property, by sheer physical 
force, and without effectively terminating the con-
tract interest of Mr. VomBaur, had placed into 
possession, one Ray Thomas, who on his own, had 
undertaken to re-do the entire operation, and who, 
by the time he was discovered, had made rather 
extensive alterations in the premises. 
Mr. Neilson suddenly became unavailable 
to Mr. VomBaur. He refused to even discuss 
the illegal dispossession with him. Mr. Vom-
Baur consulted with appellant, who was also 
unable to obtain satisfactory ans".-"ers. Lending 
to the strange turn of events the only interpret-
ation that could be given them, namely that Mr. 
Neilson had reneged and gone back on everything 
he had promised, had led Mr. VomBaur into a 
trap, had left him with the full responsibility of 
paying the workmen, and withdrawn his financial· 
backing, left him in apparent default on his Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, and had placed a stranger, 
one Ray Thomas in illegal possession, the last 
of which acts brought about the demise and ces-
sation of the theretofore flourishing business of 
TEENE TOWNE, counsel (appellant) commen~ed 
an action and en.joined the trespass and illegal 
entry of Mr. Neilson until the matter could be 
concluded. 
Mr. Neilson thereupon filed an action to 
quiet his title as against Mr. VomBaur. The 
three cases, (1) The lien-claimants case against 
Mr. Neilson and Mr. VomBaur, (2) Mr. VomBaur's 
case against Mr. Thomas and Mr. Neilson, and 
(3) Mr. Neilson 1 s case against Mr. VomBaur were 
all consolidated for trial. 
Although Mr. Neilson had been in virtual 
partnership with Mr. VomBaur, the trial court 
held that his interest in the property was not sub-
ject to the mechanic's liens. Mr. VomBaur vir-
tually confessed a liability to the mechanics and 
materielmen, which is as it should have been. 
Mr. Neilson, however, was so utterly unable to 
rnake even a prima-facia case against Mr. Vom-
Baur, that the trial court granted a motion to 
dismiss his case against Mr. VomBaur as soon 
as Mr. Neilson rested. His forfeiture case was 
so completely devoid of merit that the trial court 
didn't ev·en want to hear the defense. 
Vindicated in his claim that Mr. Neilson's 
illegal entry into Teene Towne had been nothing 
but a breaking and entering, Mr. VomBaur and 
appellant, {who had become co-owner of the prop-
erty through the victory against Mr. Neilson) 
commenced an action against Mr. Neilson for the 
damages he had caused to the TEENE TOWNE 
enterprise by his illegal trespass. Damages were 
assessed in the complaint at $1, 800, 000. 00. 
Mr. Neilson discharged his attorneys and 
retained J. Reed Tuft to represent him. Mr. Tuft 
' took a soft-sell on appellant and Mr. VomBaur. By 
feigning remorse at his mistakes, shifting the blame 
for the unwise c :>urse of action he had taken to Scott 
Woodland, who, Mr. Tuft and Mr. Neilson claimed 
had grossly misled his client, and ·shifting the blame 
to Mr. Neilson's alleged excessive consumption of 
, alcoholic beverages, about which appellant knew 
nothing at the time, and by lamenting that Mr. 
Neilson was all but shut down on his credit resources 
due to the pendency of that damage suit, Mr. Tuft 
finally convinced appellant and Mr. VomBaur that 
Mr. Neilson should be forgiven for his mistakes, 
that he would do almost anything in return for a dis-
missal of the damage action, and that he would sell 
the TEENE TOWNE property back at a lJig discount, 
on contract, if the appellant and Mr. VomBaur would 
allow him to quiet his title to the property without 
contest. 
As an added inducement, Mr. Neilson, having 
learned through his attorney, Reed Tuft, who had 
learned through another client A sael Sorenson, that 
appellant had made application for a mortgage loan 
on the Surety Building, offered to lend his credit, 
financial statement, and to use his banking con-
nections to get a loan for appellant locally. 
While this offer lent some temptation to the 
matter, appellant was reluctant to deal with Mr. 
Neilson on any basis. The memory of what had 
just happened at T EENE TOWNE made appellant 
wonder whether it was worth the risk, to get in-
volved with Mr. Neilson, merely to get a loan at 
a lower interest rate and with fewer points dis-
count. Appellant had obtained two other loan com-
mitments in Houston, Texas and was proceeding 
th close with one of them whil,~ these negotiations 
were taking place. 
At :Mr .. Tuft's insistence that he absolutely 
controlled Mr. Neilson, and that he would personally 
warr.ant that Mr. Neilson would never, ever, under 
any circumstances interfere with appellant or his 
building, did appellant relent. Appellant agreed 
that Mr. Neilson could shop the loan at the local 
banks, and furnished him with appraisals, title 
reports, and plans and specifications with which 
to work. Mr. Neilson tried at several banks, and 
finally obtained from Walker Bank and Trust Company 
a committment for $85, 000. 00 at 6 1/ 4% interest 
for 15 years, with a 1% service charge. While 
the amount was disappointing, (Houston had offered 
$100, 000. 00), the interest rate was good (Houston 
wanted 7%), the service charge was good (Houston 
wanted 6% discount), and the term was good (Houston 
had only offered a 10-year loan). Appellant and 
the second mortgagee were able to negotiate an 
agreement to re-write $5, 000. 00 of the second mort-
gage, which brought tO'tal financing to $90, 000. 00. 
During luncheon engagements and on other 
social occasions, Mr. Neilson and Mr. Tuft were 
making repeated assurances of continuing help in 
appellant's temporary money squeeze. The 
temptation \Vas simply too much, and appellant 
succumbed to the temptation to be helped, and 
agreed that Mr. Neilson could go ahead with 
the loan, as appellant's agent, on the terms 
stated. In the meantime, a satisfactory arrange-
ment had been reached regarding the TEENE 
TOWNE property, and the whole matter was 
concluded. 
It took a month or two after that to clear 
the title to the subject property, hereinafter 
refer red to as the SURETY BUILDING. Until 
that time, no-one had even concerned themselves 
with the fact that record title was vested in the 
name of Herta K. Dennett, appellant's wife. A 
long development of the historical background re-
lating _to this matter seems unnecessary. Suffice 
it to say that the record title has always been in 
the name of Herta K. Dennett, but that appellant 
has always had possession and always managed 
the property. For estate planning and other pur-
poses, appellant have from time to time, variously 
considered the property to be that of Mrs. Dennett, 
that of appellant, and that of both. Since appellant 
and Mrs. Dennett have always issued combined and 
consblidated profit and loss statements and balance 
sheets, it has really never been an issue, until 
this law suit was commenced, as to who owned 
the property. 
The pro::-osed closing at Walker Bank and 
Trust became so annoying and complicated, that 
appellant told Mr. Neilson and Mr. Tuft to forget 
the whole matter- - it wasn't worth the trouble. 
Mr. Tuft and Mr. Neilson wouldn't let that happen, 
thouah. In advance of the closing, Walker Bank had 
b 
prepared a closing statement which was so distorte-d 
and inaccurate, and so totally unacceptable, that 
appellant and his wife, e·ven on the day of closina 
t:::>• 
decided not to go throug~1 with the loan. Hal 
Waldo entered into the picture, trying to save the 
loan, inasmuch as Walker Bank had quite an invest-
ment in it by then, and agreed to insert in the closing 
statement certain reservations which would preserve 
certain rights with respect to certain of the items 
therein recited. When, however, Mr. Waldo made 
an addendum to the trust deed to the effect that if Mr. 
Neilson ever conveyed title back to the grantors, ap-
pellant and his wife, that Walker Bank could declare 
the trust deed at once due and payable, appellant and 
his wife walked out of the closing and refused to go 
forward. Mr. Neilson pursued appellant down the 
corridor, insisting that the matter be concluded, and 
assuring appellant that if Walker Bank ever invoked 
that clause, that he could get equal or better financing 
elsewhere at any time, and would do so, if called upon 
to do so. 
It was decided, however, that it would be 
imprudent to sign the deed which appellant had pre-
pared, which ':Wa°uld have reconveyed title to the 
grantors, due to the new addendum made to the 
trust deed. Appellant's wife had left in the mean-
time, as had Mr. Neilson's wife, and the remaining 
details were hashed out between appellant, Mr. 
Neilson, and Hal Waldo. Walker Bank agreed to 
send Mr. Neilson the disbursing check in a few 
days, after the final title policy had been issued. 
Mr. Neilson and appellant departed the bank 
together. As we left, Mr. Neilson said, "Okay 
kid, there's your deal. Good Luck. Drop by the 
office in a few days and get your money. 'Take good 
care of the building and make your payments. I 
don't want Walker Bank asking me for any money on 
this. II 
Out of the closing proceeds of $85, 000. 00, 
appellant authorized dishursement, conditionally, 
and with rights to reclaim refunds reserved, of 
$30, 298. 21 to Federated Security Insurance Co., 
of $23, 028. 00 to Waller &~ Lewis, second mortgag-
ees, of $375. 00 for a title policy, of $850. 00 for 
the 1 % service charge, of $116. 95 for a .speCial 
improvement district assessment, and for miscel-
laneous recording, photograph, credit report, and 
amortization schedule expenses in the approximate 
amount of about $25. 00. Appellant further authnrized 
the withholding of $1, 000. 00 to insure completion 
of the hard- surfacing of the parking lot and $3, 100. 00 
to cover a latent defect in the title. In tabular form, 
the debits and credits look like this: 
Loan Proceeds: 85, 000. 00 
Disbursed to Federated 30,298 •• 21 
Disbursed to Wall er '&Lewis 23, 028. 00 
Title Policy 375.00 
1% Service Charge 850. 00 
Special -Improvement Dist 11 6. 95 
Misc. Expense 25. 00 
' Parking Lot Escrow 1, 000. 00 
Title Company Escrow 3, '100. 00 
Balancing Totals 85, 000. 00 57, 793. 16 
Undisbursed Residue 28,206. 84 
~~~~~~~~--''---~~~ 
Totals to balance 85, 000. 00 85, 000. 00 
There was a tenative agreement to apply $17, 140. 00 
of the residue towards the indebtedness of E. R. 
VomBaur on the Teene Towne property on con-
dition that the property be sold so that the joint 
owner ship of the property in Murray City be 
reflected in E. R. VomBaur and the appellant. 
This condition never came to pass, but A. P. 
Neilson may have attempted to apply it for the 
Purpose it was originally earmarked. If so, 
this can simply be the subject matter of another 
law suit. 
Mr. Neilson did, however, upona:ppellan~'s 
request, disburse the sum of $7, 565. 17 to cover 
some pres sing bills. For this he should receive 
credit. To carry the building through a period 
of remodelling, appellant left all of the balance 
and residue of the loan proceeds with A. P. 
Neilson in trust, and to increase the balances 
on hand, caused to be paid to Mr. Neilson the 
rent due from the Community Mental Health 
Center of about $2, 000. 00. Appellant further 
added about $400. 00 of his own funds to the 
escrow in about February of 196 7, bringing the 
total funds for which Mr. Neilson. has not yet 
accounted to about $23, 041. 67 plus the $1, 000. 00 
which was escrowed at Walker Bank and Trust. 
Mr. Neilson has been asked repeatedly for 
an accounting, which he has, in nearly two years, 
failed to supply. Through counsel, appellant has 
been able to ascertain that Mr. Neilson has dis-
bursed about $13, 000. 00 in payments and con-
strue tions cos ts until last summer, and perhaps 
another $3, 000. 00 or $4, 000. 00 since then, so 
that the funds on hand may nearly be accounted 
for by now. 
Appellant retained possession of the build-
ing, in accordance with the understanding that 
Mr. Neilson was retaining record title only in 
trust. The first several months elapsed without 
incident. Mr. Neilson's bookkeeper simply made 
the installments due to the bank out of the funds 
she was holding in trust. 
Disaareerrent started when Mrs. Riter, 
b 
closing agent at Walker Bank began to annoy . 
Mr. Neilson about the black-topping on the park-
ing lot. The installation was held up due to an 
about-face by Salt Lake City Corporation, which 
in conjuntion with the buirding permit issued to 
appellant, required that the water drainage be 
directed southward from Douglas Street to 2100 
South, instead of northward, as the water had 
theretofore drained. Reversal of the drainage 
1 pattemrequired extensive engineering, design, 
and fill, which appellant undertook, during the 
months of June and July 1966 to do. Before 
this could be done, however, .the entire rear 
wall of the building had to be removed, new 
foundations and footings installed, and a new 
wall built. This was done entirely by appeallant, 
nearly two months after the closing at Walker 
Bank. Just when the mulch was ready to be in-
stalled on the parking lot, on about July 20th, 
1966, the City Engineer intervened, and indicated 
that the drainage had to be reversed to conform 
with the old pattern. 
This needless and expensive about-face was 
frustrating and expensive to say the least·, and was 
a source of renewed irritation to Walker Bank and 
Trust Company, who in turn harrassed Mr. Neilson 
because the parking lot wasn't installed. Annoyed 
by the incessant calls made to him by Walker Bank, 
Mr. Neilson, in turn made frequent calls to appellant, 
inquiring as to what was holding up the installation. 
Upon being told about the city 1 s position, 
Mr. Neilson volunteered his help to get the prob-
lem solved. He claimed to be a political creditor 
of George Catmull, and recommended that he engage 
Mr. Catmull' s personal attention to the completion 
of the job, rather than to pursue an action against 
the City. He then requested appellant to leave the 
matter of the parking lot entirely to him, and not 
to interfere; that he could get it done best without 
any help. 
This sounded like a reasonable solution, 
and so the total responsibility was given to him 
on or about August 15, 1966. 
Upon Mr. Neilson 's intervention, work 
and progress ceased suddenly and completely. 
Appellant was concerned about the mounting 
loss of income and the unexplained delays. Ap-
pellant tried, but was unable to make any con-
tact at all with Mr. Neilson. He was frequently 
in Southern California. Other times he was 
"indisposed", or 11busy". Through these various 
excuses and delays, the installation of the park-
ing lot mulch was not completed until May 1967, 
a lapse of nearly nine months from the time he 
undertook the job. During this time, there was 
a complete cessation of rental income, and through 
Mr. Neilson's delay, the building got into financial 
difficulty. 
During December 1966, appeliant and Mr. 
Neilson looked over other needs of the building, 
for which Mr. Neilson had soµie help during the 
off-season in the construction business. Two 
offices had some old rain damage (although neg-
ligible), and the feasibility of installing a new 
roof was discussed. Appellant and Mr. Neilson 
agreed that a shell would be built over the front 
part of the building, where there were previously 
gables, and a new built-up roof installed over the 
flat part of the building. The cost was estimated 
at about $1, 000. 00 plus labor. There were other 
miscellaneous needs, too numerous to detail here. 
These amounted to about $2, 000. 00. The agreement 
betv,reen appellant and Mr. Neilson was very simple. 
Appellant would provide about $1, 000. 00 towards 
payment of the building's needs. Mr. Neilson would 
advance the rest. Mr. Neilson would furnish an 
accounting of the funds he had on hand still, and 
if the expenditures exce'eded the funds on hand, 
appella;1t would apply all of the gross rent pro-
ceeds towards payment of the over-draft until 
the account was in balance. 
Things progressed quite well for about 
three months. Mr. Neilson 1s personal problem 
with intoxicants becan1e a s~urce of considerable 
annoyance, and at times he would send workmen 
to do work appeallant had already had done, and 
do other irrational things, but by staying in close 
contact with the project, appellant was able to 
keep things under control. 
As it turned out, Mr. Neilson grew so 
irritable at times that £1.ppeUant made the dis-
bursements Mr. Neilson had agreed to make, 
rather than to aggravate him. Between November 
1966 and May 1767, appellant disbursed, instead 
of the $1, 000. 00 he agreed to disburse, the sum 
of $2, 150. 83 to materialmen and laborers. The 
list is too detailed to burden this brief with a list 
of the parties and amounts. 
On March 7, 196 7, Mr. Neilson and appellant 
had a rather serious and major confrontation. Ap-
pellant had contracted with Mountain Fuel Supply 
to install a gas meter in the front of the building 
between the filigree blockwork and the front wall, 
and had carefully had the gas mains engineered so 
that the largest feeder pipe faced towards the place 
the mater was to go, and then reduced in size by 
steps, as branch lines were taken off, so that the 
pressure to each appliance could be equalized and 
no furnace or water heater would be starved. 
After paying the fee, and arriving on the 
job a few days later, appeUant learned that 
Mountain Fuel Supply had undertaken to have the 
meter installed in the rear of the building. 
The placement was not only dangerc,,s inasmuch 
as it was on a parking lot, but unsightly, and 
engineered completely backwards, so that the 
gas flow went into small pipes and then progres-
sively larger pipes. Furthermore, the meter 
was in the way of the next construction step, where 
building was to take place shortly, a most annoying 
and expensive development. 
When called to account for the incorrect 
installation, Mountain Fuel Supply replied that 
Mr. Neilson had ordered the chap.ge. They 
were very apologetic and agreed to take out the 
yard line and install it as contracted. Within 
a few minutes Mr. Neilson arrived. He was 
hardly rational. He was so completely under 
the apparent influence of intoxicants that he 
could hardly ta1k, and flew into a rage. He 
said that if appellant did not let him do the con-
struction work, and stay away from the job until 
he got it done, he would take the building away 
from appeallant. He accompanied his threat 
by a harmless assault, which due to his condition 
consisted nf no more than flailing the air. 
Within a few days, Mr. J. Reed Tuft 
contacted appellant and deman~ed some type of 
surrender of poss es sion until the building could 
be finished, rented and occupied, or some type 
of receiver. Mr. Tuft demanded a Carte Blanche 
as far as additional expenditures were concerned, 
a rather unlikely proposition in light of the conduct 
and behavior of Mr. Neilson recently exhibited. 
A proposal that the items Mr. Neilson tho~ght 
should still be done should be inventoried and carefully 
bid was rejected by Mr. Tuft. Upon refusal to 
agree, Mr. Tuft instigated aru action in the District 
Court. 
Be it remembered, that appelhnt or his 
wife has always treated the building as theirs, 
and fa. P. Neilson has never treated the building 
as his. His accountant informs app1.::llant that 
Mr. Neilson has never claimed any operating 
profit or loss, or interest or taxes paid on his 
income tax return. Likewise, Mr. Neilson has 
never had possession of the building, except when 
he broke and entered, by force, about tl:1e time 
the dispute over the gas meter arose. 
Mr. Marshall, upon filing the complaint 
approached Judge Stewart M. Hanson in the 
hall of the City and County Building. What 
happened there can only be pieced together, but 
discloses a rather unique happening. Judge Hansen 
signed a paper which Mr. Marshall put in front of 
him. He apparently didn't know what he was sign-
ing, because when approached the next day by the 
appellant, he not only denied that he ha·a signed any 
papers relating to appellant or his wife, but further 
denied signing any injunctions or appointments of 
receivers on the previous day. When pressed by 
appellant for explanations, the judge became quite 
annoyed and adamant, and only when confronted 
with his own signature on an order appointing a 
receiver and enjoining certain activities on the 
building, "11.d he finally realize what he had done. 
What he said in commentary on the, piatter at the 
realization of what had happened, is not proper 
subject matter to repeat in a brief. He did the 
only thing available to him, namely to exempt from 
operation of the injunction and receivership the 
appellant's estate and activities. One thing was 
brought out at this point, however, and that was 
the fact that no witnesses had been sworn and te·stified 
in support of the matters which would have jastified 
the temporary relief sought and obtained, this 
notwithstanding the requirements of Canon 16 
of Judicial Ethics. He thereupon disqualified him-
self sua sponte from entering any further orders 
relating to the affairs of appellant er his wife., so 
that he would not be requested to do anything further 
m the case. 
Mr. Marshall, thereupon, without producing 
further witnesses, tried to get appellants order 
vacated, and being unable to induce Judge Hansen 
to act again, we:it to Judge Wilkins, representing 
to him that there had been a full-blown hearing on 
the mer its, and inducing him, by this mis represent-
ation to vacate Judge Hansen's o~der. At this time, 
no further witnesses were called. 
In the meantime, tenants for the entire build-
ing had been secured, (in advance of April 1st), 
the work completed, except for the mulch on the 
parking lot, ant.: the building was producing in-
come. 
At the hearing held on Ap:dl 20th,, 196·7, 
the entire day was occupied in adducing testimony 
on the ownership of the beneficial interest of the 
building, which was to be probative of the question 
as to whether Mr. Neilson had failed to join an 
indispensible party, namely the appellant, in his 
action against Herta K. Dennett. 
Nothing was said about his standing to seek 
a receiver. Neither was anything said about the 
condition of the building on about April 1st, 1967. 
Only a few parties testified , and they said nothing 
about anything material or relevant to receivership 
questions. Mr. Neilson's witnesses were; 
Asael T. Sorenson, who testified regarding 
the value of the premises in January 196 7 
while the premises were under construction, 
but knew nothing about their value or condition 
in April 1967, some four months later after all 
remodelling had been completed and the building 
was ready or nearly raady for occupancy. 
Mr. Burton Stanley testified about a mechanic's 
lien that had expired or nearly expired, and which 
was not being foreclosed, a fact totally irrelevant 
to any questions regarding receiverships. 
Lowell Garrett testified that he had inspected the 
pr em is es in January 196 7, and his observations 
regarding rain damage, but knew nothing about 
the building in April 1967. 
Glenna Beddoes testified regarding disbursements 
made out of appellant's trust funds, but said nothing 
regarding the balances on hand, or the offsetting 
receipts. 
These witnesses were tc>.ken out of turn, so 
that they could be excused. No one rested the case 
on the matter of receivership. No-one offered any 
evidence at all on the question of Mr. Neilson's 
status to seek a .. receiver. No-one offered any evidence 
on the question of the condition of the premises in 
April 196 7. Had anyone offered any evidence on 
either question, or rested their proof on either 
question, appellant or his wife, would have had 
a multitude of evidence to defeat both questions. 
The case never even reached this point. 
At the end of the day, Judge Wilkins denied Mrs. 
Dennett' s motion to dismiss for failure of the 
plaintiff to join an indispensible party, and based 
upon the denial of that motion alone installed a 
receiver in the premises, without having heard one 
word of evidence about the question of either status 
or need. 
Mr. Marshall therupon prepared an order, 
and carefully omitting to send a copy thereof to 
either appellant or Mrs. Dennett's attorney, 
M. Byron Fischer, made a series of 6 findings, 
not one of which was supported by one shred of 
evidence, and which are completely, individually, 
and categorically contrary to every fact. He made 
it appear in the findings that appellant and his wife 
were at fault in the cessation of income on the build-
ing. The truth of the matter is that the entire fault 
lay with Mr. Neilson, who took nine months to install 
the parking lot, which was not more than a three-day 
job. 
Mr. 1'.1arhshall created a 5 point order, which 
absolutely went wild, and which conferred upon the 
purported receiver powers never dreamed of, including 
summary dispossession of the appellant, including the 
right to remodel and change the character of the premises 
at will. 
The interest of appellant in the property, how-
ever was never reached. The order related only 
to the interests of the litigants. 
Mr. Neilson disappeared to Europe during 
the ensuing three months, so that he could not be 
reached for depositions. First Security State Bank, 
seeing the trap they had been led into by Mr. Neilson, 
withdrew as receiver and refused to serve. 
In Auac;.st 1967 a motion '.vas filed to substitue 
0 ' 
Alvin I. Smith as receiver. Without reciting the 
tedium in connection therewith, let it be obj>erved 
that several hearings, all without evidence on the 
two basic questions, culminated in the order of 
appointment which was signed on September 13, 
1967, which purported to appoint Alvin I. Smith 
as receiver of the premises. 
Mr. Smith has, until this date, failed to 
qualify as a receiver, in that he ha::> f~iled, inter-
arra:- to file the undertaking made mandatory by 
Rule 66{d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,, ----~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~:..._~..:.......:. 
On about August 28, 196 7, however, appel-
a nt found a prospective renter, Mar Don, Inc. who 
in the meantime has needed more and rnore space 
in which to operate its business, Patricia Stevens 
Career College. On August 28, 1967 there was no 
receiver at all, and particularly none of appellants 
inters st. Mar Don, Inc. , paid $1, 800. 00 in ad-
vance rents and agreed to finance the completion 
of the second story through advance payment of 
rents. 
Mr. Smith intervened, stopped the remodel-
ling, wrote a lease of his own, ignoring appellant's 
lease, put them in a different part of the building, 
and proceeded to gut the building, removing reck-
lessly and without regard to its condition, expensive 
mahogany partitioning and panelling and expensive 
carpeting. 
He has succeeded also, in the meantime, in 
driving away two wonderful tenants, who simply 
'refuse to have anything to do with a person who 
behaves the way Mr. Smith has behaved He has 
been guilty of many other items of untoward con-
duct including failure to keep the first trust deed 
current. 
The $1, 800. 00 collected from Mar Don, Inc. 
Went into the building. However, the court, without 
authority, order the funds turned over to Mr. Smith· 
ARGUEMENT 
POINT ONE: MR. NEILSON HAS NO STANDING 
TO SEEK A RECEIVER. 
He has no standing except that of trustee, _ 
who took nominal record title for the sole purpose 
of obtainipg a loan for appellant or his wife. 
He might have had standing to file a mech-
anics or contractor 1 s lien for improvements, but 
he has failed to do this. 
Trustees categorically, and contractors 
who do not file liens have no standing and are 
not included in those classes described in Rule 
66 (a) (1) and 66 (a) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
POINT TWO: MR. NEILSON HAS THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF IN ESTABLISHING HIS STANDING, 
IF ANY HE lHAS. 
The Record will show that there has been 
not one shred of evidence offered in support of 
his claimed standing. 
POINT THREE: MR. NEILSON HAS THE BURDEN 
OF SHOWING THE NEED OF A RECEIVER, EVEN 
IF, ARGUENDO, HE HAD SHOWN STANDING. 
There was no need for a receiver. The causes 
are described in the same rules cited. The causes 
did not exist. He offered no eVidence at all on the 
question, and the little bit of evidence that was taken 
was not rested, and related to a different perio~ 
of time, after which there was very substantial 
claim. Furthermor-e, no opportunity was given 
to rebut the evidence which was offered. 
POINT FOUR: ff'HERE WAS NO RECEIVER AT 
ALL ON AUGUST 28, 1967. 
The rents collected on August 28, 1967 
were collected at a time when Fi~st Security 
Bank had withdrawn, and Alvin I. Smith had 
not yet been appointed. 
POINT FIVE: EVEN IF THERE WAS A REC-
EIVER, THERE WAS NOT A RECEIVER OF 
APPELLANT'S INTEREST. 
Appellant's interest in the property was 
not reddered subject to the jurisdiction of the 
court until he was allowed fo intervene, which 
was on about September 13, 1967. 
POINT SIX: ALVIN I. SMITH HAS NOT YET 
QUALIFIED AS A RECEIVER. 
A receiver until he qualifies is not a 
receiver. He qualifies, if there is sufficient 
standing on the part of the applicant, which 
there was not, if there is sufficient cause for 
a receiver, which there was not, and if he 
files an oath and an undertaking. He may have 
filed an oath, but he has not filed an undertaking. 
The undertaking is not discretionary, but 
mandatory. The word "must" not "may" is 
used in the rule. What would the administrator 
of an estate, or the executor of a will do which 
would be legal if he hadn 1t properly qualified. 
His acts would be void. 
POINT SEVEN: THE COURT HAD NO JURIS-
DICTION OVER APPELLANT'S PERSONAL 
AFFAIRS OR PROPERTY. 
This argument needs amplification, but 
may perhaps be treated in a reply brief when 
it is learned what respondants have to say about 
it. 
POINT EIGHT: NO COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO 
ORDER THE TURNOVER OF PROPERTY TO A 
NON EXIST ANT RECEIVER. 
If Mr. Smith had qualified, it might have 
shed a different light upon the matter. Sine e he 
hasn't, there isn't even a person constituted who 
could legally receive the money. 
POINT NINE: APPELLA:\"T CANNOT BE DEPRIVED 
OF HIS PERSONAL PROPER TY WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
If Mr. Smith had some right to the money, 
he should bring a civil action, so that the defenses 
to his claim can be tried in accordance with the 
facts and the law. Summary procedures are nearly 
always violative of consitutional guarantees, and 
most certainly in this case. 
POINT TEN: CIVIL OR COERCIVE CONTEMPT 
CAN ONLY BE USED TO ENFORCE LEGAL 
ORDERS. 
The Statutory Language of the Chapter on 
Contempt limits its operation to the enforcement 
of legal or de rs. This, by implication, exempts 
from its operation illegal orders. A person is 
within ,-his· rights to disooey an illegal order of 
the court. This order, which appellant elected 
to di.sobey was illegal. But above and beyond, 
the money, being appellants to do with as he waw 
fit, was spent on the building, and the re was nothing 
much to turn over, if any, by the time Mr. Smith 
1 
s 
order of appointment was filed. 
CONCLUSION: There is no receiver of the 
property at all. There has been neither a 
showing of status nor necessity. Furthermore 
the purported receiver has never qualified. 
If he had qualified, which he has not, he could 
not recover appellant 1 s property summarily, 
but only upon consitutional principles of due 
process. The order of the court to turn over 
money was unconstitutional, ultra vires, and 
illegal, and appellant was within his rights to 
disobey a civil contempt order of that nature. 
Deficiencies in arguement, if any, may 
be supplied, with leave of court, in a response 
brief when it is seen what respondants have 
to say to these arguments, if the court should 
permit a response 
